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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                            
No. 06-1035
                             
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
   v.
SAMUEL ROGER LEADER,
               Appellant
On Appeal from the  District Court
for the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00142)
District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 4, 2006
Before: MCKEE, BARRY AND STAPLETON, 
CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: January 11, 2007)
        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
MCKEE, Circuit Judge.
2Samuel Roger Leader appeals the sentence that was imposed after he pled guilty
to illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  For the reasons
that follow, we will remand to the district court for resentencing pursuant to our decision
in United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006).
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not recite the factual or procedural history except insofar as is helpful to
our brief discussion.  It is, however, important to note that the district court gave the
following explanation of this sentence at the sentencing:
THE COURT: Mr. Leader, I note that the sentencing
guidelines are, ... advisory, but that being so, I must find
some reasonable compelling factors to invoke liability to
ignore the guidelines.
  I have heard none. None at all.  I accept the
recommendations and findings of the Office of Probation.  I
will therefore [sentence you to] the Bureau of Prisons for
fifty-one months. ...
This is your sentence, sir, do you have any questions?
App. 28-29.
The government argues that there was no error at sentencing, and that even if
there was, the defendant’s failure to object to the sentence that was imposed requires that
we review for plain error only, a standard which the government claims the defendant
cannot meet.  Appellee’s  Br. at 6.  In fact, the government interprets Leader’s challenge
3to the sentence at this point as being tantamount to a claim that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object.  The government also claims
that Leader is not entitled to relief because, “even if Leader had preserved his sentencing
issue, his sentence is reasonable.” Id. at 9.  According to the government, the sentence
was reasonable because the district court “heard argument from the defense and
prosecution and gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553 factors.” Id.  We cannot
agree.  
It is clear from the aforementioned excerpt from the sentencing hearing that the
district court did not give adequate consideration to 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  In fact, from this
record we cannot be certain the court gave any consideration to the sentencing factors set
forth in that provision other than the sentencing guidelines.
We do, however, agree that our review is limited to whether the district court
committed plain error in imposing the sentence.  In order to establish plain error in the
imposition of a sentence, a defendant must establish an error, that is plain, and that
affected substantial rights of the defendant. United States  v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 251
(3d Cir. 1998).  In Cooper, we stated,  “district courts must impose sentences that
promote the sentencing goals listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 437 F.3d at 225-26.  It is
now clear that a sentence that is imposed without giving adequate consideration to those
factors is, by definition, “imposed in violation of the law,” and therefore unreasonable.
See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 328. In order to ensure that a sentence is properly imposed,
4“[t]he record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the
§3553(a) factors.” Id., at 329.  “The court need not discuss every argument made by a
litigant . . . Nor must the court discuss and make findings as to each of the §3553(a)
factors . . ..” Id.  However, the record must contain a sufficient reference to those factors
to allow us to review for reasonableness.  Where, as here, the defendant has advanced
non-frivolous arguments based on the § 3553(a) factors, some articulation of the court’s
thoughts regarding them is a necessary predicate for our review.  United States v.
Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006).
This record contains no discussion of the § 3553(a) factors at all or the arguments
advanced by the defense in reliance thereon.  Rather, it contains only the aforementioned
statement that the district court would impose a sentence pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines absent “compelling factors to . . . ignore the guidelines.”  This approach to
sentencing is clearly in violation of the sentencing regime that continues to evolve in the
wake of Booker and its progeny. 
As we have previously noted, a sentence that is within the appropriate guideline
range is not, by that fact alone, a reasonable sentence. In Cooper, we explained that “[a]
sentence that falls within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable than one
outside the guidelines range [,]” 437 F.3d at 331, but we refused to usher in a new round
of mandatory guidelines by suggesting that a sentence that falls within the guidelines is
necessarily  reasonable.  
Because we are vacating Leader’s sentence and remanding his case for1
resentencing, we need not address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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Given the discussion in Cooper, as well as United States v Davis, 407 F.3d 162,
164-65 (3d Cir. 2005), it is clear that the sentence that was imposed here cannot be
sustained on this record, and that the district court must be afforded another opportunity
to impose a sentence based upon a consideration of all of the factors in §3553(a), not
merely on the guidelines alone.  1
II.
For the foregoing reasons that follows we will remand this case to the district
court of the Virgin Islands for resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker.
